

FREEZE:

15 July 83 (out from Wash, MX
lobbying, to SF)

Hyp: Conceive Freeze as a quickly-negotiated
moratorium — e.g. a work-out & flight-testing, and
deployment, of ballistic missiles

(occasional of US moratorium on SL-r CMs):

WHILE NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS (+ demand Halt:

except for functional

maintenances, preserving

or enhancing stability:

(some C⁴; Inter I (C-4);

Midjetron).

LEAVE OUT "PRODUCTION"

~~FOR~~

TACTIC: "MORATORIUM" (STRIKE)

1985-86

- Original Freeze: 1) and it post-Reason Expe, willing to
implement

2) lines, not ready to specify details as if
Congress were negotiating;

3) Not ready to exploit opportunities to achieve
(at least parts of) Freeze through Congress, under Reason
(after Jan 12, 1982; or referendum, Nov 82...) (MX...)

4) Mistake? 3) "Freeze," rather than halt, stop,
or "clipping at cut levels
not "instead of reductions" moratorium: further "no control" only in
form of reductions from cut lines.

not "reductions first — i.e. increases now/first, while
waiting for agreement (on negotiations).
(Not, "reductions later" (which is impossible))

But "only reduction, no increases/additions, from now on"

(b) inclusion of Production. (+ CMs?)

(c) emphasis on negotiated stop (vs. unilateral

initiative; mutual halt (both, as in 1958-61: Wander; Werner)
or, immediate moratorium).

UJ

* Freeze approach rejects assumption that increases are
(or even, beneficial?) associated with
messy to prospect of reductions; or that risks of US +
SU increases are outweighed by improved prospects (if any) of reductions

"REDUCE NOW/FIRST"

(i.e. negotiate reductions
now/first, while
increasing)

MEANS

"INCREASE FIRST/NOW"

Our response to new SU weapons need not be new US weapons, and must not be new CF/distrib. weapons. WE SHOULD REDUCE/FOREG TYPE II, even if SU pursues X.

FREEZE

15 July 83

forego of distrib/CF - NFU (MHH)
1, weapons

Errors (cont.):

["We should stop, now; and seek mutual commitment to stay stopped, so long as other sides."] X

CF distrib.
- No new/more weapons, on either side.

- - Lack of focus on: What can/must be done under Reagan; before 1985⁸⁴⁻

- (Dim. - actual (potential) size of inventory, i.e. + US

- - thresholds: - N-bank

- MX

- P/CM deployed

- SLCMs

- reserve gas

- Central America

- (Poland, Afghanistan... ME?)

- non-nuc/RDF build-up.

- No proposals on Reductions; what, when (arguable)...

from point of view of Congress

- [To wit: no concession to "need to vote for some weapons system." (NO!)]

- Apparently, "absolutist / purist (NO - no more) / naive on SU ("") / unilateral (new - give absolute inventory)"
- Never, lack of focus on Congress (education lobbying... work - grass-roots)

- - and on a) interim goals, efforts

b) What must be avoided, and why...

- X ○ - or on (c) specific indicate "partial Freeze" proposals: flight-test ban ^{CTB}
- Focus on Cong. Resolutions (instead of budget decisions)

- - Willingness to "accept"/submit votes for Freeze Res from reps. who intended to vote for de-stabilizing US initiatives: MX, D-5, P, CM (has been: C-4, N, reserve gas... ^{Midnight;} (45M!) ^{8-1?})

(A smaller vote for Freeze Res - linking it to those who would + did vote against MX - would have been less dramatizing to Movement than a Freeze "victory" accompanied by MX "victory.")

- - Lack of priorities on weapons to oppose (above); or rationale for doing so, "unilaterally."

Bile Cochran/Perry
FAS; anti-MX

Freeze:

address (what Freeze ignores: "What to do
under Reagan: 2) till '85
3) maybe after '85!
"How to get reductions; how to maintain Det..."

Further - You see as tactical errors of Freeze:

1) Refusal to accept power of USAF/MIC to
maintain a land-based ICBM force;

"TRIAD" (if you
Freeze!)

then, "and" to limit "replacement": perhaps

with new "stable" weapons (along with air control eqpt)
(as MM-II modes)

2) Refusal, for USAF/MIC (Congress, Estab) maintenance of land
force: then, B-1/Stallion, ALCMs...

(3) Role of Stabs - maintaining testing, "modernization", maintenance...

But they ignore:

1) Diffusion in Pres goals and priorities from this
(in fact, the existence of a coherent, Pres/Admin set of
goals) (TYPE II, not I-only"; instability (Sovs, too - at least
+ D-L Adm as long as US does!)

2) In particular, desire for instability - given - SU challenge

3) then, Adm resistance to single-warhead missile
(as possible alternative to MX); insistence on at least
100 MX, and probable Adm (not just, Congress/USAF/MIC)
drive for 200-300, + D-5 and ABM.

(Scramcraft answer to
SU D-5?)

And, Adm uninterest in any deal with Sovs
(same on this approx as "victory") - even if election
does hang on it!

(Wickham, Romford - who see INF agreement as
necessary + diff for reduction, have "bitch" - underestimate
Reagan resistance to easy agreement! because
they fail to see R strategy.)

4) Strength + persistence of anti-missile mount:

- the obstacle it posed to the approach

- and the opportunity it created for an alternative (thwarting
+ defeating Reagan approach (till '85) and perhaps his revelation.

then, "and" to
maintain
"modern"
Type I Det
(define requirements)
D-L? Type II...

Don see
R's effects on
instability as
careless
errors.

Sty "joined
Reagan arm"
smoothing -
and asked
too little.

Jesse
Prostan

George
Somaripa

Randy
Kehler

Paul
Pickers

Bob
Fleischer

Jan
Orr-Harter

Kate Conway
(Detroit)

Dan
who?

Glenn
Stassen

Don
Slocum

Karin
Fierke

Carla
Johnston

happening:

20 July 83

- MX antip.?
- (FAST FOR LIFE; Aug 6 votes) ✓ Aug 27 demo ✓
- Freeze law - Senate (debate?) (amendments?)
- R proposals: 4 ~~Measures~~ build-down?
- Sept.?

Midyear?

"flex."

INE?

- Congress on Central America

- MX approps

- R/XAM ENO demos, CD (violence? police states?)

- Freeze decs on [P/CM? Immediate Freeze?

- P/CM deployment

- HAR Report on Central America.

- (Andropov dies?

Hands win?)

- SU responses to MX: SSX, LOW,

15

✓ - Even responses to P/CM.

" "

X

- SU responses to P/CM:

- mes - East Europe

- S

- ashes off US?

X

- Cuba III?

a "Falklands"

- Central American War

- US/SU would war

- ME?

ABM?

"End of arms control"?

Accusations of SU "cheating" (ABM?)

[i.e. The environment of the arms race is about to change, as is the dynamics, the momentum/inertia

Frage

"Long-range goals" (after a Frage, or as it approaches)
do not include proposals for reduction!

- Goal: End (& reverse) the Arms Race: ^{avoid} addition
of any new weapons on either/both side(s). (Pres)
Avoid new US weapons either of 1) Frage (preferable)
or (2) rejecting funds (Congress; 2d best), with unconditionally
or conditionally on Pres' proposal (+ SC rejection) of a Frage,
or on (b) SC rejection.

- Thus, under Reagan, a negotiated Frage is not
a plausible "First Step": other public/Congressional
acts/actions are necessary in the period before a
Presidentially-proposed Frage is plausible. (above)

- The F. Campaign doesn't seem to have seen the
need for formulating and pushing pre- Frage goals
and pressures under Reagan — perhaps it didn't
foresee moment would be so big by 1983 (1982) that such
as to require

exp. for 1983:

P, MX, CM

(ASAT, 3 spec,

ASAT, CBW

+ see

Central America
(Falklands)

(also, Somerville's original emphasis on Cong. budget
action got lost — Why? ("Not prioritized." Why?
In 1982, campaign got sucked up into Resolution strategy
of Cong. initiatives).

Lack of these goals + role, thus, have led to
diminishment & demoralization: and to lack of influence
on critical decisions.

(Strat. Mktg agenda did not recognize need for
a new FF to address possible re-direction of
goals of next 6-12 months.

March 24, 83

Anti-Freeze

"modernization":

1. Balance: Incident? B-1? (MX?)

[Issue should be avoided if US whatever SU does - in next 5-10 years!]

[Opponents argue as if

1) SU had been offered a Freeze, + rejected it.
[i.e. "the only way to get reductions is to threaten a "buildup""]

2) SU would not be building new weapons
as our "caught up."

3) ... "aiming to negot" had not been tried for 20-38 years

3) our (joint) security will be higher at higher joint
levels of arms - with more FS weapons on both sides.
- cut arms race is + will decrease risk of war...

4) SU had initiated most arm developments, and
forced the peace, ignoring US offers

[see cont in Freeze: "absence" of to say that
both sides were responsible.]

[SU's contribution has been to be "evil"; to
dominate tyrannical East Europe; to maintain large army;
and to watch US test devel, after a lag; finally, after
20 years, to build up to US arm cap.
US cont. has been to, lead and force power of arm
and arm devel, prod, & threats.
[replied to SU non-arms "threats" (cap.) by
US cont. has been to, lead and force power of arm
and arm devel, prod, & threats.]

(5) SU develops worship US's on proof of
intent of "world domination."

(6) R proposed reductions unaccompanied by additions of
new weapons, of the most dangerous sorts

(ignoring "security" as if START included a actual STOP on new FS weapons)

(7) in it made no difference what kind of weapons + basics...

- A bilateral freeze, negot., is best.

but requires Pres to propose.

- An informal non-tension is next best:

either side can initiate; Congress can enforce as US side.

- While or until negotiating, Congress can & must avoid or postpone US developments that may stop such a freeze maintainable by a Pres willing to propose it:

P, CM

(and less: MX*, B-1, weapon testing, D-5*

(* if deployed, increased FS instability).

- "Unwaring" in Time Nov (NYT March 19, 1983) that focus will be more forthcoming when P is deployed, is about simply wrong

[SU does not put highest priority on stopping or reversing arms race:

Compared to: 1) "not having to back down in ^{+ abandon allies} confrontations again (like Taiwan Straits, Cuba II, Berlin, shipping, Egypt '73).

(2) Admitting to being #2 — by accepting unbalanced arms agreements, or foregoing US tech. developments.

People who oppose Freeze as if:

as if: — What is in SU interest ("SU advantage")
could not be in US interest (i.e. no mutually
'advantageous' agreement is possible.

— ... strong relative suc "advantage/superiority"
is still possible for either side.

(All that can be aspired to is increased — &
perhaps higher than opponent's — credibility of
triggering one war (not, prospects of fighting, limiting,
controlling, or winning one war).

This requires projecting image of lack of
control, of knowledge, or of rationality — reflected in
hardness and behavior and statements (+ personnel!)

It can work — like going into battle with a
battle of nerves

You wouldn't want your daughter to make her
living that way —

or live in a neighborhood where that you was
being played.

Each side is watching the other in efforts to make
the opponent less secure.

JUNE 83

Resolution

form A

B

C

Effects

Why

Politics

Home proposal 1982

Reo, with Denny, Aspin,
Pritchard, Hamilton

Congress is ~~about~~ is considering authorizing funds for
testing + producing a new missile

2000

The USG should not

Congress should not auth funds or testing without
~~trying to~~ exploring the possibility of a bilateral
halt to the testing — ~~how~~, the prod. + deployment — of
new missiles

No Pres has ever...

No Congress House has called on Pres to (i.e. X who
but has not forced him to do so ^{voted for MX})
nor done what it could to force confront
the issue with an opportunity...

Proposal: Call on the Soviet Government to cease the
— land-based and air-based —
flight-testing of all MIRVed ^{ICBMs}, Congress ^{must} ~~must~~
suspend all such ^{US} tests ^{for six months} ~~from~~ as of a certain date
^{say, Nov 3}
(^{several} months after passage of the bill), with extension
of this suspension (or, removal of testing) to be
~~statutory~~

7
- We only have one President — and we only have
him for 4 years.

- Therefore, when our Pres gets into a disastrous corner, we don't
have another Pres to turn to — we only have Congress.

- Fortunately, we don't have both houses of Congress controlled
by the Pres' party.

- They just act that way, sometimes; but we can change
that.

- That leaves it to the House — or rather, it leaves it to us —
because if we leave it to the House, the House will
leave it to the White House.

- Don't let us of the recent vote on the MX, Congress
is participating in a program that escalates the arms race,
~~that~~ without the USG even having offered to halt the
arms race.

~~They should~~ Before participating in a decision to
launch a new cycle in the arms race, Congress should
assure that the SC has been offered a clear chance
to end the nuclear arms race.

This must be done without the close participation
leadership or full collaboration of the Executive Branch;
Therefore, those aspects of the Foreign that would require
mutual highly negotiation — e.g. verification agreements
trading up on production and some deployments (e.g. GLCMs,
SLCMs) — ~~that~~ cannot be covered in a
legislative approach. But a mutual ^{halt to} ~~halt~~ on the flight-testing
of MIRVed ICBMs — preferably, both SCBMs + land-based missiles —
ballistic missiles

would stop "cold" the most dangerous situation
develops on both sides. [If SCBMs are inhibited, this would
prevent a Soviet Trident II (D-5): which, as the Scoutcraft
points out, is the only prospective weapon that would ~~take~~
~~hold~~ open a "window of vulnerability" on both our
bomber + ICBM forces, making both ^{potentially} subject to effective,
simultaneous attack. To repeat, no such attack is
possible today; ^{seems:} it will ^{not} become possible until the
Sovs can deliver a short-warning attack on our ICBMs,
which requires a high-accuracy, MIRV'd SCBM like our D-5.

A Testing Co would purchase this development (keeping load-based minutes visible as a deterrent to nuclear attack); no other measure — none of those proposed in SACT II or in START — does so.

Of course, the much ^{also} ~~present~~ the US D-5 (though not the Trident I or C-4); but the disadvantages of the R3 ~~unlike~~ ~~than~~ things not widely appreciated — have been pointed out correctly by Samoy, (and Dore, in 1982:').]

If this Pres will not propose a freeze, the Congress
should ^{not} ~~not~~ ~~that~~ help him buy new weapons
programs that will prevent his successor from achieving
a halt to the arms race: programs whose number he
cannot ~~not~~ overbear, and which the Soviets will feel compelled
to counter and to imitate.

Above all, they must do ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~land~~ such progress
without doing some all they can to end this competition—
without assuming that the Soviets have been confronted
with the opportunity, the clear challenge and chance, to
end this competition: A bilateral flight-test between
MIR/Vostok missiles would do this; ~~but~~ Congress has ~~not~~
done all it could to force the Pres to propose and explore
— or to explore ~~from~~ ^{the possibility} ~~directly~~ ^{to the Pres.} the Cong. action—
the possibility, and it should not ~~interfere~~ ^{prevent} ~~new~~ ^{new} testing
without doing some one or the other.

If Pres were truly attracted by "Gore argument,"
he would not need to start prod. of MX to try it
on Gore — he could just change START proposals, as
Pres 61 proposed. (START proposals are with design
to achieve Gore's ends, if accepted by Gore; for to induce
Gore counter-offers that would lead in the direction. That is
especially true if ≥ 100 MX are included as non-negotiable.

~~by Gore~~

Frage Coalition:

- Can agree that a bilateral halt is better than the present bilateral arms race [Driven by ^{technological} unilateral US escalations and SU assisted responses (increasing quantitative escalations in some dimensions:

i.e. to follow technologically - but may go beyond US numbers). (US is the one led to match in quantitative dimensions - with numbers of landers or vehicles, size or yield of warhead, throwweight, size of missiles, no. of subs ...)]

- but ranges from those who

2) oppose all weapons, one or over-one - "pacifist, unilateral disarmament"

(6) ~~the~~ those who would support all new weapons proposed "on this basis" of Pn or Service or Lab, in the absence of a negotiated ^{agreed} ~~unilateral~~ (ratified) treaty (some (many?) members of Congress.

(Though certain "arms control" rationales - building weapons to get selective reductions in others, or for stability (Mitigation), or to press SU, by this ^(MX) FS threat, into accords... are against the spirit of the Freeze (?): highest priority, as means ~~address the issue~~ to US security, to ending the ^{one} arms race, comprehensively + definitively. Strong presumption against any new weapons.

(No weapon yet proposed (unless microwave SLBMs) remotely meets the heavy burden of proof here, or even a moderate one.

(But: explains or negotiating bilateral freeze does imply the effectiveness of a threat to pursue the arms race otherwise.) (US: "independent, reciprocal, mutually-reinforcing initiatives" (Soto/ARSC)

Aspi might say: his approach is second-best, optimal given unattainability of freeze under Reagan. (That still permits testing ban imposed by Congress.)

Across the line:

- someone who proposed the Testing
dual or probe or deployment of a particular new
weapon, to a bilateral halt — or even, to the
possibility (exploration) of one. (Hore).

- or someone who prefers open-ended arms race
to any successful arms agreement, or even to
negotiations aimed at agreement.

(CPD)

- or who prefers to keep Labs working, (CCNWP)

- or "production line open" ("to get reductions...
Aspin?")

Shouldn't production have been left out? ("Verif")
and deployment? ^{or}
(Angus)
or postponed?

Neither was in store, in 1979-80-81: — for of
new systems!

Idea of "bargaining chip," "stabilizer," "threat" — ^{or "match"}
test/build a new weapon "to reduce others — or, the type as well"
(MX/SS-18)
— has been shown to be an
effective rationale for continuing arms race.
Strong presumption against it.

(Last word: Migration as replacement for MM-II.

Even Trident I can be upgraded by NAVSAT to FS weapon
(Garrin, Sicily)

Harvard study: "Living With a Nuclear Air Power."

"Living with Russia (limited) Nuclear Wars."

ac u " " " " " "

Shirts of,
trunks for,

Traditional and control: political (domestic and international) and technical/strategic briefs of new weapons or operational developments; while averting a end to the arms race, or to one's own national role in driving it.

Managing, "stabilizing," and
maintaining a (occasionally ~~even~~ accelerating)
 and rose.

Reducing risks, supposedly, ^{"lower} higher than they would be without any control measures "

- though actually, an entire process (with its political ^{payoffs} ~~risks~~) may enlarge the overall one race, on both sides, creating more political support for reversing the ethnic-

(Ans control creates a desire for which it is a partial antidote — or sedation, analgesia...)

Human Version is a "right-wing Freeze" (to extent
it permits and perhaps even encourages building up to
the point of a signed Treaty; in fact, this could be
stimulating to us now, esp to that point, which might
not be reached! (see SALT-II! "Pinet" for CTB!
via Partial Test ban), (SALT-I!)

Especially if no moratorium at onset of negot.
(or unilateral initiation, immediately) — still more, if
this is under act (as Hauer Res suggests, though it
does not say so directly).